

**Opening the Negotiation System:
An Initial Examination of a Multistage and Multilevel Framework**

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Author Note

Excerpt from theoretical foundations and literature review of dissertation proposal.

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Dynamic contexts confront individuals in organizations with complex problems. These problems frequently require cooperation between parties with diverse interests. How effective these parties negotiate divergent interests has lasting implications for both individuals and organizations. Indeed, because negotiations punctuate key career milestones, individuals are motivated to develop their negotiation skills by learning from those with greater expertise (e.g., coursework in MBA programs) and experience (e.g., popular management books). Further, because negotiations are central to many business deals (e.g., strategic alliances, supply chain procurement contracts, etc.), organizations work to make negotiation a core competence (Movius & Susskind, 2009) as well as invest heavily in the negotiation skills of their employees through selection and training initiatives. For evidence-based initiatives, the research on negotiations is both highly influential and potentially problematic.

One broadly recognized problem is that practitioners focus on different areas of negotiations than researchers. Researchers primarily rely on “one shot” negotiation tasks and focus on a single stage (Pruitt, 2012). Indeed, of the studies covered in a recent review, 90 percent of negotiation research addressed the bargaining stage (Jang et al., 2018). Researchers focus on bargaining tasks largely because they are conducive to experimental control making them instrumental to strengthening causal inference (Cook & Campbell, 1979). In contrast, while recognizing bargaining is a pivotal point in the process, practitioners primarily focus on the planning and implementing stages. Indeed, a review of published prescriptions from specialists in various domains found less than 30 percent of recommendations addressed the bargaining stage (Jang et al., 2018). Practitioners focus on planning and implementing, largely because of

the complex problems they face. For example, negotiators need to consolidate information across levels of the organization as well as inputs from the broader market context before an actual negotiation. Further, many business relationships do not end after a negotiation—but rather are the formalization of the beginning of a relationship.

This divide persists because practitioners operate in an “open system” world while researchers continue to construct a “closed system” literature. The open system paradigm holds that researchers need to examine interactions between components of the system as well as between the system and the embedding context, while the closed system paradigm holds that researchers can examine components of the system in isolation and that the system is independent from the context (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). Researchers have argued the closed system paradigm contributes to the practitioner-researcher divide (Hüffmeier et al., 2011). This divide remains where the limited scope of the literature precludes conclusive evidence for best practices in critical areas of the negotiation process (e.g., planning or implementing stages). Even worse, some established best practices for the bargaining stage (e.g., using integrative strategies to maximize joint gains) may have unintended consequences that are not immediately evident during a single stage of a negotiation.

Beyond the practitioner-researcher divide, researchers have argued the closed system paradigm contributes to a weaker science (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). Closed system negotiation research negatively impacts knowledge dissemination through lower citation rates—both within the organizational sciences and between related fields (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). Further, the predominance of cross-sectional research designs precludes establishing temporal precedence, weakening causal inference (Cook & Campbell, 1979), as well as resulting in an

unbalanced examination and piecemeal representation of the negotiation process. Indeed, this is part of what has driven the calls for a general theory of negotiations (Jang et al., 2018).

To redress these issues, it is essential to programmatically incorporate open system tenets into negotiation theory. The first section of this dissertation develops a theoretical framework of negotiations drawing on open system tenets from the study of a related phenomenon: team conflict management. Because conflict is frequently studied in teams, this literature has deep roots in the open system paradigm (Katz & Kahn, 1978). As a result of these roots, research on team conflict tends to have a more developed conceptualization of how relevant processes unfold across time and levels (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019; DeChurch et al., 2013). Incorporating these developments into a theoretical framework generates a lens through which researchers can view the phenomenon of negotiations more holistically.

The second section of this dissertation utilizes this theoretical framework to conduct a systematic review of the most recent negotiation literature. This systematic review enables a comprehensive evaluation of the recent literature and aligns articles with various areas of the negotiation process. These aligned articles identify what we already know within an open system negotiation framework. By critically examining what we already know, this review also identifies the areas we need to know better. Importantly, the areas we need to know better are not limited to understudied areas. Rather, these limitations include conventional wisdom established by largely closed system approaches that research has yet to consider the implications within a more open system context.

The final sections of this dissertation demonstrate empirically the need for research to programmatically address negotiations from an open system perspective. This is demonstrated by examining perhaps the most frequently given, evidence-based recommendation: negotiators

should utilize integrative strategies to achieve optimal outcomes, as distributive strategies will yield suboptimal outcomes (Kong et al., 2014; Weingart et al., 1990). Because the evidence for this recommendation is derived predominantly within a closed system paradigm, research has not considered the downstream consequences for this recommendation nor potential input from the negotiation context (e.g., the performance of the venture being negotiated). This is a critical oversight, as incorporating an open system perspective yields a starkly different prediction: integrative strategies can *underperform* distributive strategies in achieving optimal outcomes for both parties.

Collectively, this dissertation has important implications for the art and science of negotiation. First, the theoretical framework is precise and prescriptive about what constitutes open system research on negotiations. This clarifies directions researchers can take to bridge the practitioner-researcher divide and strengthen the science. Second, the systematic review leverages the proposed theoretical framework to organize and critically evaluate the recent literature. This provides a new perspective on what is already known as well as identify compelling future directions to develop a robust open system literature on negotiations. Third, the empirical portion demonstrates how this theoretical framework enables scholars to generate novel contributions by examining conventional wisdom in a new light. This highlights the importance of open system theorizing in generating evidence-based prescriptions for students and practitioners.

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: NEGOTIATING IN AN OPEN SYSTEM

To advance the study of negotiations, researchers need a consensus regarding the constitution of an open system paradigm. This consensus remains elusive, despite the recognized need to move the literature in this direction (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010; Jang et al., 2018). Yet,

despite efforts to move in this direction, there is only scattered evidence of open system elements in published research. However, which elements precisely constitute an open system paradigm in negotiations and, more importantly, how these elements are related to one another remains ambiguous. To resolve these ambiguities, a new theoretical framework is necessary.

The theoretical framework has two main divisions: time and levels. The time division focuses on the stages of negotiation (i.e., planning, bargaining, and implementing) as well as the transitions and recursions related to these stages. The levels division focuses on where negotiation processes occur (i.e., within-person, between-person, within-team, between-team) as well as the cross-level and contextual effects that occur between them. The development of each division of the framework includes first discussing the limitations of existing approaches and then outlining how the new proposed framework builds upon these past approaches. The scope of the past work considered in this section is limited to theoretical frameworks. The extent individual studies align with open system paradigm will occur in the systematic literature review.

Time

The best description of existing efforts to understand the role of time across the negotiation process is within an input-process-output (IPO) framework. Brett and colleagues (Brett & Thompson, 2016; Brett, 2000), for example, outline a framework of the bargaining stage which holds negotiation outcomes are a function of inputs and processes. The strategy of the negotiators (i.e., input) drives how they interact with one another in the negotiation (i.e., process). This model justifies the focus on developing adaptive strategies to manage interactions between parties to optimize outcomes (i.e., output). Further, the interests and priorities of negotiators comprise inputs that determine the outcome potential of the negotiation. This model suggests the process of gaining an accurate representation of the outcome potential will facilitate

optimal outcomes, thus justifying the emphasis on efforts to correctly identify the interests and priorities of others.

While these types of frameworks are foundational, such IPO frameworks are limited in representing the open system nature of negotiations. The limitations of IPO frameworks are largely related to representing the transformation of inputs into outputs as a linear progression through a single iteration. That is, most negotiation frameworks do not account for recursion or carryover effects in substantive ways. It is noteworthy that research related to team conflict management has long since called for a moratorium on IPO research due to these limitations, instead advocating a more dynamic or recursive approach (Cronin et al., 2011; Ilgen et al., 2005).

The issue is less that negotiation research has rarely considered recursion, but more there is a not an established way to conceptualize negotiations as embedded within the flow of time. Indeed, there are several studies in the negotiation literature that address recursion. For example, research on concession-making spirals (Olekalns et al., 2003; Olekalns & Weingart, 2008), turning points (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013), or tit-for-tat strategies in repeated prisoner dilemma tasks (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981). While some studies embrace an open system paradigm more than others, to move the field programmatically this direction requires greater clarity on how negotiations unfold across time.

Core Concepts

Understanding how negotiations unfold across time includes clarity regarding concepts such as stages, episodes, transitions, and recursion. *Stages* are divisions of the negotiation process, specifically: planning, bargaining, and implementing. Jang and colleagues (Jang et al., 2018) labeled these same divisions as phases. However, consistent with lexicon in the team development literature, phases more aptly describe gradual transitions between divisions where

stages describe defined transitions (Kozlowski & Bell, 2013). As discussed later, this more defined transition is achieved by organizing into stages by temporal boundaries rather than into phases by content.

Episodes are collections of stages, specifically the progression from planning to bargaining to implementing comprises a single episode. An episode is the fundamental unit of a negotiation, which frequently hinges on the bargaining stage. This emphasis on the bargaining stage is shared by both closed and open system approaches. Where these approaches differ is within a closed system paradigm achieving an optimal agreement in the bargaining stage is of consequence, while open system approaches are more concerned with realizing optimal outcomes across all stages (Jang et al., 2018).

The progression from one stage to another within an episode is an example of a transition. *Transitions* are forward progressions from one division of time to another. Transitions are important as the outcomes of one division of time become inputs for a subsequent division of time. These carryover effects from the past are important in understanding a phenomenon as embedded in time as well as a holistic understanding of a negotiation episode. The term transition could also describe the conclusion of a negotiation, when the negotiated agreement is successfully implemented and the interdependence binding parties together is dissolved. The effects of the concluded negotiation could carryover as parties transition onto other endeavors.

While progression can occur by transitioning from one stage to the next, for example, progression can also occur reverting back to a previous stage. *Recursion*, in contrast to a forward progression, occurs when progression is achieved by cycling backward to begin a process again. While recursion can be adaptive (e.g., cycles of asking questions and sense-making; Maitlis & Christianson, 2014) or maladaptive (e.g., concession-making spirals; Olekalns et al., 2003), the

defining feature is returning to a previous function. The possibility of returning to a previous function is central to an open system perspective as it accounts for non-linear progression.

Recursion can occur on various timescales. The temporal units used in the conflict management literature include both moves and periods (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019). A “move” is the smallest timescale and reflects a specific conflict-related action taken by a party. In negotiations, this could take the form of an offer or counteroffer (Weingart et al., 1999). A “period” is the broadest timescale and reflects a portion of objective clock time over which moves and non-conflict related behavior can occur. In negotiations, this could refer to various areas, including an entire episode, a single stage, or the first few minutes of a stage (Curhan & Pentland, 2007). The timescale of a given phenomenon has important implications for recursion and transitions.

The following sections discuss the relationship between stages, episodes, transitions, and recursion in conceptualizing how negotiations unfold across time. First, the “recursion within stages” section addresses the micro-dynamics that occur throughout a negotiation. Second, the “transitions between stages” section discusses the typical progression through a negotiation episode. Third, the “transitions and recursion between episodes” section is concerned with the implications of multi-episodic negotiations. Together, these sections advance an open system framework of time in negotiations.

Recursion Within Stage

Despite researchers acknowledging the importance of recursion (Jang et al., 2018), there is no developed framework for studying recursion within stages in the negotiation literature. However, there is in the team conflict management literature. Specifically, the System Dynamics Framework (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019) details the role of change in open systems. This

framework holds that as parties negotiate a conflict, meaningful change occurs in the system and in the conflict itself (Olekalns & Weingart, 2008; Weingart et al., 1999). This change is not conceptualized to be strictly linear nor haphazardly chaotic. Rather, the change is systematic and predictable.

Part of the systematic and predictable nature of change in open systems is due to recursion. Within the System Dynamics Framework, variables display inertia as they maintain a given level over time (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019). The levels of focal variable can increase or decrease depending on the presence of other variables. Together, these variables can have a mutual influence on each other. This mutual influence can contribute to escalation (e.g., competitive behavior from Party A incites negative affect in Party B, leading Party B to direct competitive behavior towards Party A), but also allows the possibility of exit (e.g., frustration with negative behavior leads to one party terminating the negotiation, resulting in an impasse).

While this framework for recursion is useful in predicting conflict dynamics, its utility for studying negotiations is limited in its current form. This limitation is because this framework is primarily focused on the process but does not specify the content. The process-orientation of the System Dynamics Framework is an asset in studying conflict management, where issues are often less concrete and efforts to resolve the blockage can be less structured. Indeed, emphasizing the recursion between processes and emergent states is a sophisticated solution for studying a relatively less structured phenomenon (DeChurch et al., 2013). However, incorporating this structure with stage specific content can enhance the study of negotiations.

Recursion within the planning stage includes garnering information and assurances about the priorities and parties involved. For example, recursion in the planning stage could occur between gathering information and making sense of that information. Through repetition of these

gathering-sensemaking cycles, negotiators refine their priorities, orient around concrete issues, and identify potential partners. This recursion is necessary, as a primary challenge in the planning stage is not the shortage of information, but how individuals are able to discern and locate the most valuable information while shedding the more peripheral. Once negotiators assess they have reached a saturation point, they exit the recursive cycle and transition to the bargaining stage. Typically, the study of negotiation begins after priorities and issues are established for participants. However, the recursive processes of how negotiators identify these priorities and issues or diagnose the problems *independent* of researchers has received little theoretical or empirical attention.

Recursion within the bargaining stage includes tactics and psychological states. For example, the tactical responses of negotiators are in part due to how individuals interpret their counterpart's behavior (Weingart et al., 2015). Recursion in the bargaining stage includes reciprocation between discrete moves (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Weingart et al., 1999) as well as iterations of broader periods of distributive and integrative behavior (Adair & Brett, 2005; Olekalns & Weingart, 2008). Of the three stages, the current understanding of recursion is most developed in the bargaining stage. Indeed, research on turning points is an emerging area of study (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013), which includes ending a competitive spiral or initiating a cooperative spiral. While recursion between moves is important, there is unfortunately less attention afforded to the sensemaking (i.e., naming) and attributions (i.e., blaming) in response to specific moves that serve as key mechanisms (Korsgaard et al., 2008).

Recursion within the implementing stage includes balancing different factors to ensure the outcomes specified in the negotiated terms are realized. Even after a mutually acceptable deal is made, during goal pursuit unexpected challenges and setbacks frequently arise (Jang et al.,

2018). Interdependent parties can adapt to these challenges through iterative cycles of surveillance and intervention. The recursive processes that negotiators use to maintain an equilibrium of the system and regulate efforts towards goal accomplishment are not well understood. Understanding the implementing stage requires greater attention to the adaptive and maladaptive processes that arise, including what predicts an exit from the relationship.

In summary, recursion within stages provides structure to many negotiation processes. While the System Dynamics Framework provides structure less prevalent in existing negotiation research, it does not specify potentially recursive content for negotiation stages. Existing theoretical work has considered recursion between moves and offers in the bargaining stage. However, there is dearth of work involving psychological states as well as other stages.

Transitions Between Stages

Beyond the recursion that occurs *within* stages, the incumbent framework of how a negotiation progresses *between* stages is outlined by Jang and colleagues (Jang et al., 2018). This framework organizes the negotiation process into three central “phases” distinguished from each other by function: the planning phase is concerned with diagnosing a problem, the bargaining phase with generating a solution, and the implementing phase with translating agreements into outcomes. These authors explicitly acknowledge recursion, arguing that “negotiation rarely follows a rigid sequence; the parties often cycle back to an earlier phase” (Jang et al., 2018, p. 321).

This Three-Phase Framework poses considerable advantages over previous frameworks. For example, by moving beyond the bargaining phase and acknowledging the potential for recursion, this framework draws attention to challenges of the planning phase. For example, an important part of planning is strengthening the best alternative to the negotiated agreement

(BATNA; Pinkley et al., 1994). Jang and colleagues (Jang et al., 2018) point out that strengthening a BATNA is a dynamic process that implies multilateral negotiations (i.e., multiple negotiations occurring in proximity to one another regarding the same task). Further, this framework draws attention to the implementing phase. Specifically, the agreements of the bargaining phase do not automatically materialize into the desired outcomes. Rather, the parties must actively work to implement the agreed upon terms.

Stage vs. Phase

While the Three-Phase Framework is perhaps the most developed open system negotiation framework to date, it is not without limitations. The first limitation is how a phase is conceptualized. This limitation stems from tradeoffs in precision between two elements of phases. One element is the content of phases (e.g., diagnosing problems characterizes the content of the planning phase, etc.), and the other element is the temporal boundaries of phases. This framework prioritizes the precision about content of phases at the expense of precision about temporal boundaries of phases.

This prioritization is evident in how the Three-Phase Framework addresses recursion. For example, recursion to the planning phase would occur any time a negotiator diagnoses a problem. However, diagnosing perceived incompatibilities of positions between parties frequently arises while bargaining. Similarly, there are numerous problems that need to be diagnosed while implementing an agreement. While perhaps the principal efforts of diagnosing a problem occur in the planning phase, continued refinements span all phases of a negotiation. However, this precision in defining content requires frequent recursion, blurring the boundary between phases substantially. Hence, their use of the term “phase”.

Dividing the negotiation process into these phases is limited in its ability to facilitate open system negotiation research. To facilitate open system research, a framework needs to establish precise temporal boundaries. Without precise temporal boundaries, theorizing the flow of negotiations rapidly becomes unwieldy—not to mention collecting the requisite data. Precise temporal boundaries allow researchers to divide a complex phenomenon into manageable pieces. Indeed, the disadvantages of prioritizing precise content over precise temporal boundaries outweighs the advantages.

One disadvantage to prioritizing content is it creates the illusion that content is comparable regardless of when it occurs in a negotiation episode. In reality, processes are qualitatively different depending on when they occur in a negotiation episode. For example, diagnosing problems before sitting down at the bargaining table is a different process than diagnosing problems after an agreement is made. Rather than treating these diagnostic efforts as recursions of comparable processes, there is greater theoretical utility in examining the relationships between constructs that are occurring in closer temporal proximity. Another disadvantage to prioritizing content is it artificially narrows relevant phenomenon. Indeed, diagnosing problems and solving problems can occur throughout a negotiation episode. Ironically, organizing by content requires affording more attention to time, requiring researchers to trace complex changes and chaotic patterns involving the content. However, time is not a substantive variable, but a space in which substantive processes occur (Ancona et al., 2001). Organizing by clear temporal boundaries allows individual studies to define the theoretically relevant content while allowing for a more parsimonious way to organize multiple studies into a collective body of work.

However, these limitations of the *phase* framework can be reduced substantially by instead adopting a *stage* framework. By reversing the priorities, a stage conceptualization takes a different perspective on the content of stages as well as the relationships between stages. Rather than organizing the content by a general function (e.g., diagnosing a problem, etc.), the stage framework organizes the content around two milestones: arriving at the ‘bargaining table’ to exchange offers and arriving at a decision. The planning stage encompasses multiple functions that occur before arriving at the bargaining table. The bargaining stage encompasses multiple functions that occur between arriving at the table and arriving at a decision. The implementing stage encompasses the functions that occur after arriving at a decision (see Figure 1). Organizing content around milestones instead of general functions enables a tradeoff, where the temporal boundaries are more precise, but the specific content is less precise (Bacharach, 1989).

The content of stages is less precise in part because a single stage allows for a broader array of functions compared to a single phase. This is because the stage framework separates functions from milestones, where the phase framework does not. Importantly, separating functions from milestones does not refute the organization of functions into categories made by the phase framework. Rather, the stage framework refutes the assumption that those categories of functions are orthogonal. That is, a function may primarily occur in one stage, yet still occur in another without being classified as recursion between phases. Rather, it is classified as a function spanning multiple stages. This simplifies the relationship between stages considerably without reducing the number of relevant functions. This change in organizing the content enables more precise temporal boundaries, which is necessary to programmatically study the relationships between divisions of the negotiation process and facilitates the accumulation of knowledge.

Transition vs. Recursion

How the Three-Phase Framework conceptualizes the relationships between divisions of the negotiation process is a second limitation. To conceptualize these relationships, the phase framework relies primarily on *recursion*. This reliance on recursion is necessary due to the fluid temporal boundaries of a phase. However, the rigid temporal boundaries of a stage enable the open system framework to rely exclusively on *transitions* to explain relationships between stages.

This reliance on transitions means the outputs of one stage become inputs for the next stage in a linear fashion. Specifically, the outputs of the planning stage become inputs for the bargaining stage, just as the outputs of the bargaining stage become inputs for the implementing stage. Importantly, within the stage framework, a linear transition between stages is not only the norm—but direct recursion between stages is not possible. This is because stages are organized around concrete milestones, unlike phases organized around discretionary functions. Meaning, for example, negotiators cannot change from the bargaining stage back to the planning stage without going through some form of an implementing stage first. However, this does not imply all stages are identical in terms of quality and duration.

Variance in the quality of a stage is essential to consider when theorizing about the relationship between one stage and another. While true for all stages, this is perhaps most apparent regarding the implementing stage. Implementing stages begin with decisions, which include both agreements and impasses. Which decision is made at the end of the bargaining stage has important implications for the nature and quality of the subsequent implementing stage. Not all implementing stages begin with the ideal agreement where the parties have achieved Pareto-optimal terms across all negotiated issues. Nor do all implementing stages maximize their quality by realizing the agreement or achieving optimal outcomes.

Indeed, sometimes negotiators should not have made an agreement at all. For example, research on agreement bias recognizes that negotiators often make agreements when they should have reached an impasse (Cohen et al., 2014). If such agreements are enacted, the negotiators are unlikely to achieve their desired outcomes resulting in a lower-quality implementing stage. On the other hand, in such instances, disengaging from the agreement and terminating the relationship would result in a higher-quality implementing stage.

In contrast, sometimes negotiators decide on an impasse, when they should have decided to make an agreement. For example, a negotiator may “walk away” from a potential agreement, despite their BATNA being worse than that agreement (Pinkley et al., 1994). If such an impasse is enacted, then the negotiators are unlikely to achieve their desired outcomes resulting in a lower-quality implementing stage. On the other hand, revising the decision in a way that leads to preparing to return to the bargaining table would be characteristic of a higher-quality implementing stage. In this sense, an impasse—just like an agreement—is a decision that negotiators need to implement. Indeed, effectively managing the implementing stage following an impasse is important to avoid “burning bridges” as parties may need to interact in the future. This may be especially important when an impasse decision arises from concerns about the need for more time to gather information or consider alternatives before bargaining further.

Beyond the quality of stages, there is considerable variance in the duration of stages as well. While true for all stages, this is perhaps most apparent with the planning stage. In an effort to comprehensively address all relevant information, negotiators may invest considerable resources into the planning stage yielding higher-durations. On the other hand, due to time pressures or an impromptu opportunity, negotiators may invest considerably less resources into the planning stage yielding lower-durations. However, a brief stage is still a stage.

The quality and duration of stages is an essential element in theorizing about the relationships between stages. Identifying antecedents that predict changes in the quality and duration of the different stages would inform best practices. These best practices would enable negotiators to increase the quality of different stages and achieve optimal duration contingent on various circumstances. Beyond managing the antecedents, negotiators would also need to manage the consequences from the quality and duration of one stage on subsequent stages. Indeed, the quality and duration of one stage is likely to impact the economic and relational outcomes throughout the negotiation process.

In summary, the proposed framework centers on transitions between stages and provides considerable advantages over recursion between phases in the Three-Phase Framework (Jang et al., 2018). By shifting priorities from organizing functionality to organizing temporality, stages provide more precise temporal boundaries compared to phases. This simplifies the theory of how one stage transitions into another. This emphasis on transitions emphasizes the theoretical import of stage quality and duration and reduces reliance on recursion. While the reliance of the Three Phase Framework on recursion is not inherently problematic, exclusive reliance on recursion overcomplicates and obscures the actual recursion occurring in the negotiation process. Indeed, what was labeled as recursion between phases could more accurately be classified as recursion within stages, as discussed previously, as well as recursion between episodes.

Transitions and Recursions Between Episodes

Researchers nebulous use of the term “negotiation” to encompass a wide range of phenomena and processes obscures the fact that complex negotiations are comprised of manageable components. Indeed, as noted by Jang and colleagues (Jang et al., 2018), frequently what is described as a single “negotiation” is actually comprised of multiple negotiations with

different partners, and frequently the same partners return to the bargaining table on multiple occasions. Meaning, what was once conceptualized as a single large Gestalt labeled a “negotiation” is better described as several discrete episodes—each with their own planning, bargaining, and implementing stages. Understanding transitions and recursions between these episodes is crucial in developing an open system framework of negotiations.

Importantly, the episode-centric approach advocated here simplifies efforts to understand the flow of the negotiation process. While understanding recursion between moves is essential when examining within-stage processes, applying the same timescale to the entire scope of the negotiation process is undesirable. Representing the microdynamics of the negotiation process in an uninterrupted stream can only be satisfactorily done with computational models (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019). Therefore, an open system framework that requires this level of temporal resolution cannot facilitate empirical research on a sustainable scale. Alternately, a feasible open system dynamics approach is centered on current and recent event management (Morgeson et al., 2015).

Conceptualizing negotiation as managing current and recent events reduces the burden of accounting for every moment that transpires in a negotiation. Instead, the emphasis falls on accounting for effects of past episodes on a focal episode. While a negotiation can comprise numerous episodes, the most important past episode is the one immediately preceding the focal episode. This is because the most recent episode explains the most variance, with each additional past episode explaining only incremental variance beyond the one preceding it. Therefore, an open system framework needs to address systematic differences in how one episode affects another episode.

The most developed existing approach for understanding transitions and recursions between episodes is found in the work of Curhan and colleagues (Becker & Curhan, 2018; Curhan et al., 2010). This work distinguishes between repeated and sequential negotiations, where *repeated* negotiations involve engaging in more than one negotiation episode with the same partner and *sequential* negotiations involve engaging in more than one negotiation episode with different partners. While not a formal framework, this work acknowledges the effect of one negotiation episode on another episode varies depending on the partner.

While the deliberate attempts of the Repeated-Sequential Approach to move beyond closed system bargaining is admirable, this approach remains quite limited in facilitating open system negotiation research. This limitation is due to focusing exclusively on the role of partners (same vs different) and failing to acknowledge the role of the task (same vs different). Indeed, both dimensions are essential in understanding the effects of one negotiation episode on another. For example, negotiating with several different car dealers for the same make and model of a car (different partners, same task) is qualitatively different than negotiating the price of a car relatively soon after negotiating the price of a house (different partner, different task). The following sections outline important theoretical processes and examples when crossing the dimensions of partner and task changes between episodes (see Figure 2).

Different Partner, Different Task

The effects between episodes are likely weakest when both the partners and task are different. This is because the effects of the prior episode are incidental to the focal episode. These incidental effects are in part because this relationship between episodes is best characterized as a transition, as the episodes are not nested within the partner or task. However, incidental effects can have an impact on decision-making, such as mood (Andrade & Ariely,

2009) or even anchoring by unrelated numbers (Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Additionally, when partners and tasks change with regularity, this may require negotiators to be especially mindful of prioritization, efficiency, and time constraints.

One area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is in contexts characterized by serial negotiations. For example, some decision-making positions in organizations may require individuals to engage in multiple loosely related negotiations. This could span various contexts, ranging from diplomacy to sales. Another area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is when individuals transition identities. For example, engaging in an inter-organizational negotiation one day, but an intra-organizational negotiation the next. As negotiations are not confined to the domain of work, this would also include the effect of negotiations at work on negotiations at home.

Same Partner, Different Task

The effects between episodes are likely weak when the partners are the same, but the task is different. This relationship is best characterized as recursion, as the episodes are nested within partner. These between episode effects are stronger than when the partners are different because of the shared history. This shared history becomes an asset if leveraged effectively, but a liability when poorly managed. For instance, negotiators may fail to adequately adjust to the new situation—relying too little or too much on past experience. Further, personal matters can interfere—such as negotiators turning a blind eye because of a good relationship (Curhan et al., 2008) or bad blood hampering a potentially effective interaction (Kilduff et al., 2016).

One area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is within-organization negotiations. For example, negotiating with a supervisor regarding personal career decisions (e.g., salary, promotions, etc.) as well as organizational decisions (intra-department budget

allocations). Another area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is in long-term relationships. When one party works with or does business with another party long enough, eventually they will negotiate with the potential for multiple negotiations. In these instances, the history between parties will affect the negotiations.

Different Partner, Same Task

The effects between episodes are likely strong when the task is the same, but the partners are different. This relationship is best characterized as recursion, as the episodes are nested within the task. These between episode effects are stronger than when the partners are the same because the task is the reason the interdependent parties are negotiating. These relationships embedded in the task history affect changes in the negotiation process as well as satisfaction with this process. For instance, subjecting the present negotiation process to counter-factuals and negative evaluations because it is worse than the past negotiation process or counter to expectations about the present. Further, individuals may satisfice because the present negotiation process is better than the past negotiation process or expectations about the present.

One area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is whenever a BATNA is possible. For example, developing a BATNA frequently requires negotiating with a different party, allowing for comparisons across offers. Another area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is when more than two people are involved. For example, over the course of a complex negotiations divided into multiple episodes, it is possible for the representative of one-party to change. This churn in the people involved can have an important effect on the negotiation processes. Indeed, such change can be strategically leveraged by a specific party to disrupt momentum, such as a “good cop, bad cop” approach. Alternatively, many forms of coalition building would fall within this category.

Same Partner, Same Task

The effects between episodes are likely strongest when both the partners and task are the same. This relationship is characterized as recursion, as the episodes are nested within partner and task. This type of between episode effect is strongest among the four types because both partners have a shared history in the present task. This shared history places a premium on adaptation. For instance, parties need to work together to manage new information, changing priorities, or shocks. Further, parties need to manage the superordinate goal each episode is working towards, rather than letting the present episode demand priority. More colloquially, parties cannot become so focused on winning the “battle,” that they lose sight of the strategy to win the “war.”

One area this this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is in complex negotiations that require multiple episodes. For example, the sheer number of details and terms require sustained effort over time to arrive at an agreement across all terms (Helms et al., 2012). Another area this type of between-episode relationship is most relevant is when everything relevant to achieving desired outcomes is not apparent in the initial episode. For example, frequently during the implementation stage, it becomes apparent that terms need to be revisited or additional terms considered (Jang et al., 2018).

In summary, the proposed framework provides considerable advantages over the Repeated-Sequential Approach. Rather than focusing on purely the effects of the partner in multi-episodic negotiations, the open system framework also addresses the effect of the task, where the effects of the task are stronger relative to the effects of the partner. Importantly, focusing on the sequencing of episodes is analogous to sequencing of moves studied in the past. Rather than trace all possible communication dynamics throughout a bargaining stage, Weingart

and colleagues (Kern et al., 2020; Sullivan et al., 2006; Weingart et al., 1999) pioneered the approach of sequencing communications and behaviors in the negotiation literature. After coding videos or transcripts, the researchers compare the counterpart's response to the negotiator (reciprocal vs. complementary) as well as the function (information seeking vs. offer extending) and orientation (distributive vs. integrative). This allows for meaningful simplifications of complex streams of negotiation processes. Thus, the open system approach of sequencing moves in the bargaining stage is an extension of the logic to the broader timescale of episodes.

Level

The open system paradigm not only recognizes that negotiations unfold across time, but also across levels. Negotiations, by definition, include interdependent parties working towards a joint decision (Thompson et al., 2010). This interdependence implies that negotiation is a multilevel phenomenon. Indeed, real world negotiations frequently occur between teams of negotiators (Mannix, 2005). These teams are often embedded in the strata of the organizations they represent. However, the multilevel nature of negotiations has received only a modest treatment in the negotiation literature (Cohen & Thompson, 2011). As discussed earlier, the current state of the study of negotiations in the organizational sciences is primarily characterized as a study of bargaining dyads.

For example, the incumbent framework of negotiations centers on the dyad. Brett and Thompson (2016) present a model of negotiations where individual level variables combine into dyadic processes. Specifically, individual interests and priorities combine to form the dyadic outcome potential, while individual strategies combine to form the dyadic interaction. This dyadic outcome potential and interaction predict the negotiated agreement and bargaining

outcomes. Thus, the negotiation literature already recognizes the multilevel nature of negotiations extends as far as the dyadic level.

However greater conceptual work is needed for an open system negotiation framework to incorporate additional levels in a programmatic way. Indeed, “resting on the laurels” of past research on dyadic negotiations is not an option, as there is evidence that best practices for negotiations at the dyadic level do not always generalize to the team level (Kern et al., 2020; Moreland, 2010). Further, research related to team conflict management has made it clear that best practices in stand-alone teams frequently do not generalize to multiteam systems (Davison et al., 2012; Marks et al., 2005). Given that between-team negotiations are frequently used by organizations to address complex problems, it is crucial to develop a more robust representation of levels within an open system negotiation framework.

In the following sections, numerous developments in multilevel theory are incorporated into the negotiation process. This is essential as research on team negotiations, while noteworthy, has not emphasized the multilevel nature of the phenomenon compared to the research on team conflict management or the team literature generally. Specifically, the next sections will focus on (a) what differentiates one level from another as well as (b) what effects one level has on another.

Divisions of Levels

This section focuses on the four levels of most relevance to social psychologists in the organizational sciences researching negotiations. As researchers have more thoroughly addressed the within- and between-person levels, the focus here is a critical overview of the types of phenomena examined at these levels. As the within- and between-team levels remain underexamined, these sections overview critical theoretical oversights as well as alternative ways

to conceptualize these levels. Similar to the section on time, only a conceptual framework is outlined here. A more exhaustive discussion of existing research relevant to each of these levels is reserved for the systematic review.

Within-Person

Broadly, the within-person level constitutes the elements of negotiation primarily oriented around a single person. This includes individual affect, behavior, and cognition. Negotiation research has a rich heritage of studying individual cognition and behaviors through, respectively, the study of decision-making biases (e.g., fixed-pie bias; Bazerman & Curhan, 2000) and discrete tactics (e.g., first offers; Hüffmeier et al., 2014). More recently, researchers have recognized affect as a critical component in the negotiation process (see van Kleef & Cote, 2018 for a review). Thus, the negotiation literature has accumulated an impressive array of findings on the within-person level.

Beyond these more robust areas of inquiry, the within-person level also includes individual differences and changes in an individual over time. Indeed, there is recent evidence that generally stable individual differences have a greater impact on negotiations than previously thought (Elfenbein et al., 2018). Further, while there is research on patterns of concession-making over the course of a negotiation (Weingart et al., 1999), the collection of research on changes in an individual over time is less robust than other areas of negotiation. Conceptualizing within-person change is an important facet of within-stage recursion could facilitate important research in this area.

Between-Person

Broadly, the between-person level constitutes the elements of negotiation primarily oriented around dyadic relationships. This includes both singular dyads as well as collections of

dyads in networks. The dyad is the most basic unit of negotiations and includes how negotiators achieve joint gains as well as manage interactions between parties (Brett & Thompson, 2016). Partially in response to criticisms of misalignment between dyadic theory and analyses (Krasikova & LeBreton, 2012), the study of negotiations is increasing the specificity of theory surrounding dyadic processes as well as the use of more sophisticated dyadic analyses such as the actor-partner-interdependence model or social relations model (Elfenbein et al., 2018).

Despite these steady improvements, there are calls for researchers to “reconceptualize negotiations from largely one-shot, delimited interactions to a view of negotiations as involving *many actors over networks*, over time, and over space” (Gelfand & Gal, 2012, p. 445, emphasis added). Indeed, the concept of a BATNA implies dyadic negotiations are embedded within a broader network of potential negotiation partners. Because researchers typically provide participants with BATNAs, little is understood about how negotiators develop BATNAs. BATNA development is inherently a network process. Developing work on Phantom BATNAs suggests that how far along one is on these network processes also has important implications for subsequent episodes (Pinkley et al., 2019). For example, in labor markets employers frequently compete with one another to hire specific candidates and candidates compete with one another for a limited number of positions. Whether a negotiator's BATNA only has potential (e.g., initial interviewing process) or is a fully realized agreement (e.g., an offer not yet accepted) will clearly have differential impacts on this process as well as the subjective outcomes following different bargaining episodes (Campagna et al., 2016).

Unfortunately, network approaches to studying negotiations are incredibly limited. Yet, whenever there are multiple parties involved, networks are an important factor for negotiation theorists to consider. Further, networks are essential when multiple simultaneous agreements

between parties are possible, as opposed to requiring a single agreement to reflect the will of all parties. Social networks will become increasingly important to consider as negotiation researchers move beyond studying singular dyads. Indeed, recent developments in the team conflict management literature point to the essential role of social networks (Park et al., 2020; Shah et al., 2021).

Within-Team

The within-team level constitutes the elements of negotiation primarily oriented around a stand-alone team. In stand-alone teams, negotiators are motivated to optimize individual outcomes as well as collective outcomes. While pursuing collective outcomes, coalitions can and do form within teams (Gilin et al., 2013). However, in this level, one coalition cannot splinter off and enact their preferred terms independent of the other coalition. That is, typically multiple simultaneous agreements are not possible, rather a single agreement that reflects the will of all parties is required at the within-team level.

While there is certainly empirical research on stand-alone negotiation teams (Cohen & Thompson, 2011), what conceptually distinguishes team negotiation processes remains ambiguous. This conceptual ambiguity is problematic, as evidenced by findings from dyadic negotiations failing to generalize to negotiations involving stand-alone teams (Kern et al., 2020; Moreland, 2010). This suggests it is possible that other frequently taught prescriptions may not yield the desired effects when applied in real world team negotiations. Fortunately, developments in multilevel theory in the organizational sciences can provide considerable conceptual clarity to studying team negotiations.

Central to the conceptualization of teams as open systems is the distinction between process gains and losses (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Because teams collectively have access to greater

resources compared to any single member (i.e., greater inputs), teams should outperform individuals (i.e., greater outputs). However, like any system, there is potential for both process loss and gains when converting inputs into outputs. Process loss is evident in the research on team decision-making. For example, hidden profile tasks show teams often do not fully utilize available resources (Toma & Butera, 2009). Further, social loafing and group think can lead teams underperform solo individuals (Price et al., 2006). However, when the process is managed effectively, there is opportunity for synergistic gains. The programmatic study of process losses and gains is a hallmark of negotiation teams within an open system paradigm. In short, the limited research on team negotiations has primarily tried to answer if dyads outperform teams. This is the wrong question after considering multilevel theory or the vast body of team research. Indeed, a dyad is in essence a two-person team (Kozlowski & Ilgen, 2006). As team size increases, so does the potential process gains and process losses. The question negotiation researchers ought to be striving to answer is how to effectively manage the team negotiation processes to maximize process gains and minimize process losses.

Another area central to the conceptualization of teams as open systems is the distinction between processes and emergent states (Marks et al., 2001). Processes are “members’ interdependent acts that convert inputs to outcomes through cognitive, verbal, and other activities directed toward organizing task-work to achieve collective goals” (Marks et al., 2001, p. 357). Emergent states are “relatively enduring properties of the team rooted in individuals’ thoughts and feelings” (DeChurch et al., 2013, p. 560). Both processes and emergent states are mechanisms for converting inputs into outputs (Ilgen et al., 2005). Indeed, meta-analytic evidence suggests distinguishing between processes and emergent states is key to advancing the study of team conflict management (DeChurch et al., 2013). These developments in related fields

suggest research on team negotiations should programmatically study processes and emergent states in pursuit of embracing a more open system framework.

Between-Team

The between-team level constitutes the elements of negotiation primarily oriented around two or more teams working towards a common goal. Confronted with complex and dynamic problems too large for a single person to solve, organizations increasingly rely on teams of negotiators (Cohen & Thompson, 2011; Mathieu et al., 2017). For example, teams of negotiators are the norm in international negotiations, union negotiations, as well as in mergers and acquisitions (Mannix, 2005). As mentioned earlier, negotiation researchers recognize that have begun to appreciate that what is true for dyads is not necessarily true for groups (Howard et al., 2007; Kern et al., 2020; Moreland, 2010). This raises questions regarding the extent best practices for dyads are also best practices for groups. This is particularly troubling considering the relative scarcity of research on groups of negotiators.

To make matters worse, the groups of negotiators that are studied are not always comparable to the teams of negotiators frequently used in organizations. When researchers study negotiation in groups, they frequently take a multiparty approach using tasks like Towers Market (Henderson et al., 2006) or SHARC (Epley et al., 2006). This multiparty approach can only adequately capture within-group dynamics. When researchers attempt to study negotiations between teams, they frequently scale up dyadic roles by assigning participants into two-person buyer and seller teams (Swaab et al., 2021). However, recent developments on multiteam systems demonstrate these scaled arrangements operate like standalone, cross-functional groups rather than two interdependent teams (Marks et al., 2005). They operate like standalone groups largely because there is insufficient specialization of roles (e.g., lead negotiator, legal expert,

finance expert, etc.; Mannix, 2005) and the systems are small (e.g., 4-6 members) rather than large (e.g., 10-15).

This distinction between small and large systems is critical as the conventional wisdom for standalone teams does not always hold in multiteam systems (i.e., “two or more teams that interface directly and interdependently... toward the accomplishment of collective goals”; Mathieu et al., 2002, p. 290). For example, dense communication networks in standalone teams helps team effectiveness, while in multiteam systems it has the opposite effect (Davison et al., 2012). This same pattern is also evident in other areas of team research, such as planning (Lanaj et al., 2013), mental models (Firth et al., 2015), and coordination (De Vries et al., 2016). There is even preliminary evidence in the negotiation literature, as within-team bargaining preparatory for between-team bargaining is qualitatively different from conventional within-team bargaining (Van Bunderen et al., 2018). In short, there is evidence for concern that findings established from studying negotiations in dyads and teams will not generalize to the multiteam systems increasingly used by organizations in high stakes situations.

Between-team negotiations in an open system paradigm are best conceptualized as multiteam systems. However, neither literature has yet begun to study between-team negotiations as multiteam systems. On one hand, as discussed, the negotiation literature has only examined dyads and the equivalent of standalone teams. On the other hand, the multiteam system literature has exclusively examined cognitive conflict, or resolving conflicts of viewpoints (Davison et al., 2012; De Vries et al., 2016). However, McGrath’s (1984) circumplex of group tasks also identifies mixed-motive conflict, or resolving conflicts of interest. Mixed-motive conflicts frequently arise in negotiation contexts as well as in teams, yet multiteam system researchers have yet to address mixed-motive tasks. Thus, in both the negotiation and multiteam system

literatures, there is no direct evidence substantiating best practices for the between-team negotiations organizations engage in.

In summary, negotiation scholars need to afford greater theoretical attention to the negotiation process at each of these four levels. This is particularly necessary at the between-team level. Fortunately, organizational scientists are uniquely equipped relative to other fields to conduct between-team negotiation research. This is because organizational researchers examine teams with greater frequency and sophistication compared to other fields that also study negotiations (e.g., marriage counseling, law enforcement, mergers and acquisitions, sales, legal, and international relations; Jang et al., 2018). Unfortunately, the research on team negotiation remains siloed from general team research compared to related work on team conflict management. However, negotiation scholars can incorporate the negotiation tradition with multilevel methodologies as they further embrace an open system framework.

Cross-Level Effects

Importantly, in open systems the various levels of a phenomenon are interdependent. Meaning, what occurs at lower levels can unfold upward affecting higher levels through “bottom-up” processes (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Further, what occurs at higher levels can cascade downward affecting lower levels through “top-down” processes (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Two important cross-level effects for the advancement of an open system negotiation framework include recursion between the context and the negotiation as well as entrainment between levels over time.

Inputs, Outputs, and Recursion

A defining feature of an open system is that they are “open” to a constant flow of “environmental inputs” (Katz & Kahn, 1978), including from the broader context in which the

system is embedded. This input from the broader context is both similar and dissimilar from the previously discussed inputs from a prior time in the process (i.e., recursion within stages, transitions between stages, recursion and transitions between episodes) as well as inputs from a distinct level (i.e., within-person, between-person, within-team, between-team). Similar to other inputs, contextual inputs are affected by the past output of the system, making recursion between inputs and outputs a defining feature (Ilgen et al., 2005). However, dissimilar to other inputs, contextual input often exists at a higher level, making the effects less direct compared to other inputs, yet certainly still relevant enough to alter the negotiation processes.

For example, consider a negotiation between two organizations embedded in the same product market. The condition of the product market leading up to the negotiation serves as an important contextual input beyond the characteristics of each organization. The unique inputs from the organizations (e.g., resources) combine with market forces (e.g., a recent market change increasing the demand for one organization's resources) and affect the negotiation process (e.g., increasing the power of the organization with the desired resources). These effects on the negotiation process can either differentially affect parties (e.g., market change affecting some resources) or affect all parties similarly (e.g., time constraints).

To continue the example, once the bargaining was complete, the negotiators from each organization believed the agreement was instrumental for both organizations and decided to begin work to implement the agreement. Ideally, implementing the negotiated agreement would lead to positive outcomes for the organizations, such as increased performance. These changes in performance for both organizations would likely have some effect on the product market (e.g., the organizations capture a greater share of the product market). This changed product market can now serve as an input for additional negotiations. Indeed, changes in organizational

performance or market conditions could trigger another bargaining episode between the same organizations. Further, the change in performance might inspire similar relationships to form between other organizations to compete with this new development.

This example illustrates that negotiations both affect and are affected by the context they are embedded in. This recursion between negotiation outputs and contextual inputs is a defining feature of an open system framework of negotiations. Previous open system efforts have encouraged negotiation scholars to examine the effect of a negotiation on larger organizational issues (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). However, the notion of recursion between the system and contextual inputs is a noteworthy expansion, tracing its roots to seminal work on open systems (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Importantly, this open system framework acknowledges the top-down effect the context has on negotiation processes, but also recognizes this context is a function of bottom-up processes (Schneider, 1987).

Throughputs and Entrainment

Beyond the relationship between the context and the system, the different levels of the system are related to one another. Specifically, higher levels exert top-down influences on lower levels and lower levels—through bottom-up processes—emerge into higher levels. Indeed, the emergent nature of these “throughputs” are fundamental in understanding how inputs are transformed into outputs in multilevel open systems (Katz & Kahn, 1978). Therefore, an open system negotiation framework needs to account for how this emergent process unfolds across levels and time. Key to conceptualizing emergence across levels and time is entrainment.

Entrainment refers to “the active interplay among paces, cycles, and rhythms of different activities at different levels of analysis” (Ancona & Chong, 1996, p. 251). As applied to negotiations, entrainment can occur between stages and across levels. For example, leading up to

a between-team negotiation, individuals begin planning by independently generating potential team strategies. These various potential strategies are weighed and evaluated as members of component teams meet in preparation for the negotiation. As part of this strategy selection process, team members bargain with each other to decide on a final plan for the negotiation. Thus, the between-team planning stage is entrained with the within-team planning and bargaining stages (see Figure 3).

Continuing the example, after reaching an agreement in the between-team planning stage, the component teams meet to begin the bargaining stage. The bargaining potential and interactions between-teams at this stage is a function of the priorities, interests, and strategies identified previously (Brett & Thompson, 2016). After reaching an agreement, the multiteam system would transition to begin implementing the decision. Thus, the between-team bargaining and implementing stages are entrained within the within-team implementing stage (see Figure 3).

This example illustrates that the processes that occur at different levels of a negotiation episode can synchronize and resonate with one another. Importantly, entrainment is not limited to the stages of negotiation. Indeed, this entrainment between stages example relies on the assumption that members of component teams have conflicts of interest requiring negotiation within-team before negotiating between-team, rather than merely conflicting points-of-view. This is a reasonable assumption, however, as frequently negotiation teams are cross-functional, representing different areas of expertise (e.g., finance, legal, etc.). It is possible that the terms of the between-team agreement may differentially impact members of the component teams and the divisions they represent. This potential conflict of interest also has important implications for the selection of representatives in negotiations.

EXISTING OPEN SYSTEM RESEARCH: A SYSTEMATIC REVIEW

While the theoretical foundations outlined the open system negotiation framework and evaluated existing theoretical approaches, it did not consider in depth existing empirical research. Importantly, the proposed framework can reinterpret empirical research through an open system lens. Such a review serves both to organize recent empirical research and critically evaluate the extent the negotiation literature addresses various domains of the open system paradigm. This organization and evaluation have more than mere diagnostic implications, however, and can also identify fruitful areas for future development. Thus, this systematic review interprets existing findings within the open system paradigm, evaluates the current state of the literature in each domain, and identifies potential future directions.

The Purpose and Need for the Current Review

The need for systematic review of recent negotiation literature is evident when examining the topics and timespans of existing reviews. Many negotiation literature reviews focus on a specific subdomain of the literature, such as cross-cultural negotiations (Adler & Aycan, 2018), gender (Bowles et al., 2022), emotions (van Kleef & Cote, 2018), individual differences (Elfenbein, 2015), justice (Druckman & Wagner, 2016), or naivete and cynicism (Tsay et al., 2011). The more general literature reviews covered either dated or unclear timespans. For example, Bazerman and Curhan (2000) examined trends of research through the 1960's and 1990's, while Brett and Thompson (2016) did not disclose their sample selection procedures. The literature reviews relevant to open system paradigms also used dated or unclear timespans. For example, reviews of turning points in negotiations (Druckman & Olekalns, 2013) as well as the different levels negotiations take place (Thompson et al., 2010) did not disclose their sample selection procedures. Further, Jang and colleagues (2018) focused primarily on work published by specialized experts rather than negotiation research published in management and psychology

journals. Indeed, they focused their review of empirical work to those published between 1990 and 2005 (see Table 1 in Jang et al., 2018). This comprised a sub-sample of the journals addressed in the first systematic review of the open system negotiation literature (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010). Thus, there is a clear need for a systematic evaluation of more recent negotiation research relevant to the open system negotiation paradigm.

Literature Search and Review Procedures

To determine the article sample, I followed the recommendations of Hiebl (2021) as well as the precedent of systematic reviews in the negotiation literature. Bendersky and McGinn (2010) conducted a systematic review to evaluate the presence of a closed versus open system paradigm in negotiation research. They examined the empirical research published in top negotiation outlets from the years 1990 to 2005. Such journal-centric approaches help safeguard the rigor of the articles included in the review as well as provide a transparent and traceable articles sample (Hiebl, 2021). I followed this same journal-centric approach, and examined the articles published in the same top negotiation outlets from the years 2006 to 2020. Specifically, I limited the review to articles published in *Academy of Management Journal*, *Administrative Science Quarterly*, *American Journal of Sociology*, *American Sociological Review*, *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *Organization Science*, *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, and *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*. Using the Web of Science database, I conducted a Boolean search for articles using “negotiat*” in search terms, titles, key words, or abstracts. This resulted in 349 potential articles.

I then read the abstracts to identify empirical studies of negotiation, excluding reviews, meta-analyses, as well as empirical studies not relevant to the purposes of the review (e.g.,

hidden profile tasks, prisoner dilemma tasks). This yielded 192 articles. To refine the article selection further to address open system negotiation research, I read the methods of the remaining articles and identified studies that exclusively measured cross-sectional data on one-shot, bargaining dyads. This identified 94 articles that could only have limited empirical evidence for an open system negotiation paradigm and were, therefore, omitted. This resulted in a final sample of 98 articles for full analysis that reflects the most open system negotiation research in top negotiation outlets from 2006 to 2020.

Time

Within-Stage

Planning

When planning activities occur relative to the bargaining stage qualitatively changes the type of planning that occurs. Indeed, the temporal distance between when negotiators prepared an agenda for the bargaining stage and when negotiators expected the bargaining stage to take place affected their construal level (Henderson et al., 2006). Specifically, when negotiators expected the bargaining stage to take place one month after the planning stage, negotiators adopted a higher construal level and chose a more cooperative agenda. In contrast, when negotiators expected the bargaining stage to take place immediately following the planning stage, negotiators adopted a lower construal level and chose a more competitive agenda.

These proposed agendas can have strategic implications. Kteily and colleagues (2013) found that the order of issues in proposed agendas (consequential issues first versus last) affected the decision of the recipient to accept or reject the invitation to engage in negotiations. Low-power recipients were more likely to reject agendas with consequential issues last, as they interpreted this as a stalling tactic. In contrast, high-power recipients were more likely to reject

agendas with consequential issues first, as they interpreted this as a threat. Thus, a negotiation strategy begins when the parties begin to interact, which frequently starts during the planning stage via invitations (e.g., salary negotiations, international negotiations).

These strategic implications from different planning activities raise questions about what differentiates high-quality from low-quality planning stages. Existing research on this area is limited. One essential dimension of a quality planning stage pertains to gathering and making sense of information. During planning stages, the challenge is typically not a shortage of bargaining relevant information. Typically, the challenge is copious amounts of information and uncertainty about which information is relevant to bargaining. Discerning relevant information is both essential and resource intensive. Therefore, future research on the planning stage needs to examine optimal and efficient information processing. This can be done using a novel technique used by van Kleef and colleagues (2013) to study information processing motivation and recall in the planning stage. Participants were given cash to purchase information from a grid. The price of information was commensurate with the relevance of the information, with more relevant information costing more than less relevant information. The cost of the information reduced the compensation accrued during planning stage yet held the potential to increase the total compensation by increasing performance during the bargaining stage. This tradeoff requires participants to balance the opportunity cost with the potential return on investment. Thus, researchers can adapt this task to study optimal and efficient information processing in a way that is both salient and meaningful to participants.

Such research would greatly advance the field, as currently there are scarce best practices for the planning stage that are evidence-based. Indeed, only 7% of published negotiation research examined the planning stage, while 52% of recommendations from expert practitioners pertained

to the planning stage (Jang et al., 2018). While future theoretical work is needed to refine what constitutes the optimal quality and duration of the planning stage, an excellent place for researchers to start is understanding how individuals arrive where typical negotiation research begins. Typically, participants are presented with tidy and relevant information already consolidated, with priorities clearly defined, a BATNA developed, the negotiation counterpart identified, and the logistics of the meeting established. These luxuries afforded to participants in bargaining-centric research are rarely experienced by practitioners without considerable effort. This new research could build on existing research examining how goals translate into reservation points (Miles & Clenney, 2012) or how individuals select negotiation partners based on information they believe will give them a competitive advantage (Gladstone & O'Connor, 2014).

Bargaining

Several themes emerged from research within the bargaining stage, including stability, timing, trends, and shocks. When the use of a tactic is stable after choosing to use it, predictors of the initial choice to use a tactic are crucial to understand. Sullivan and colleagues (2006) found that tactic-related self-efficacy affected the initial choice to use either distributive or integrative tactics. These initial choices demonstrated strong inertia, with prior tactic use strongly influencing subsequent tactic use. These later tactics were strong predictors of negotiation outcomes. Such stability may explain why conversational dynamics (e.g., vocal mirroring) in the first 5 minutes of the bargaining stage predicted 30% of the variance in value claimed (Curhan & Pentland, 2007).

While sometimes negotiators may use tactics in a stable way, many tactics have differential effects depending on the timing of when they are used during the bargaining stage.

For example, mimicking early in bargaining positively related to value claimed, mimicking at the midpoint of bargaining positively related to value created, and mimicking late in bargaining negatively related to value claimed (Swaab et al., 2011). In contrast to mimicking, first offers that occurred late in the bargaining stage resulted in more integrative and creative solutions than did first offers that occurred early in the stage due to allowing for greater information exchange (Sinaceur, Maddux, et al., 2013). Further, implied threats (via anger) and explicit threats were more effective at eliciting concessions later in bargaining compared to early due to the heightened salience of an impasse (Sinaceur et al., 2011).

Multiple studies examined, not just the timing of a tactic, but trends over multiple rounds (van Kleef et al., 2006). This research shows that what is ultimately effective is not always initially effect. For example, Cote and colleagues (Côté et al., 2013; van Kleef & Côté, 2007) found that anger did not have an immediate effect, but the effect became stronger over the course of the bargaining stage. More specifically, surface acting anger elicited stronger demands from the counterpart, where deep acting anger elicited weaker demands (Côté et al., 2013). This suggests the regulation of an emotion is important beyond the mere expression of an emotion. Other research has found that, beyond the stable level of an emotion, the change in emotion is important. Transitioning from happy to angry led to higher economic and relational outcomes compared to steady-state anger (Filipowicz et al., 2011). This positive relational outcome was due to the pre-transition happiness creating an emotional buffer against the post-transition anger. Beyond a single transition, alternating between expressing anger and happiness (i.e., emotional inconsistency) elicited greater concessions from the counterpart (Sinaceur, Adam, et al., 2013). This effect of emotional inconsistency was augmented when anger was the last expression as opposed to happiness.

Finally, not all within-bargaining findings dealt with continuous processes, but also addressed shocks. For example, contrary to conventional wisdom, taking a break during the bargaining stage to reflect about the negotiation led to more competitive behavior and lower-quality agreements (Harinck & De Dreu, 2008). Rather, distraction breaks or breaks defined by active cooperative reflection could offset this negative effect. This suggests that how negotiators respond to shocks is important. Further, how negotiators respond to the context can influence behavior during a shock. When under threat of exploitation, negotiators developed more creative malevolent negotiation tactics during a break in the bargaining stage (Baas et al., 2019).

Implementing

The implementing stage centers on converting the bargaining stage agreement into actual outcomes, frequently via contracts. Some contracts align interests between parties while other contracts invoke a reciprocation norm. Ultimately, reciprocation was more effective than aligning interests at motivating implementing behavior (Bottom et al., 2006). Yet, parties only chose this superior contract form in the presence of trust. Negotiators can facilitate trust by incorporating rapport building into the structure of the negotiation, specifically during the time between bargaining and contracting (Mislin et al., 2011). This structural factor compliments the contractual factors (e.g., sufficiently contingent contracts).

Additional research on the implementing stage is essential, as individuals make promises during the bargaining stage in the form of agreements yet actually keep those promises during the implementing stage. In instances where these promises are not kept, one option is to enforce implementation through third party interventions. While these interventions can appear quick and even convenient, a default reliance on third parties can incur considerable costs (Mislin et al., 2011). These costs are often avoidable when the necessary resources are invested to cultivate

relational capital over time (Gelfand et al., 2006). Future research could compare such “sword” and “sickle” approaches in enforcing prior agreements. Future research could also expand upon examinations of implementing stages which are often limited to the context of employment negotiations (Bottom et al., 2006; Mislin et al., 2011). Indeed, employment negotiations often imply a power differential (e.g., employer and employee), however in many implementing contexts the different parties are peers. The role of contracts and aligning priorities is less clear in these contexts.

Between-Stage

Planning to Bargaining

Psychological states in the planning stage about the negotiation partner can alter behavior in the bargaining stage. For example, anticipated guilt for deceiving a counterpart with an honest reputation increased truthful behavior (SimanTov-Nachlieli et al., 2020). However, when negotiators engage in cognitive reappraisal (reframing a situation to change the emotional impact), experiencing guilt in the planning stage did not deter unethical behavior in the bargaining stage (Feinberg et al., 2020). This suggests that how psychological states are managed while planning is perhaps more important than the psychological states themselves.

Not only can planning behavior neutralize the effects of psychological states, but planning behavior can also neutralize the effectiveness of counterpart tactics in the bargaining stage. For instance, when negotiators processed information about the competitive personality of their counterpart while planning, decreased trust rendered counterpart expressions of disappointment and guilt while bargaining ineffective (van Kleef et al., 2006). Such information about counterparts can also improve negotiation outcomes. When exposed to information in the planning stage that aroused suspicion about the counterpart, negotiators engaged in more

information seeking during the bargaining stage which increased value creation (Sinaceur, 2010). Finally, relational anxiety led to lower reservation points and plans to make more concessions, harming economic capital yet helping relational capital (Amanatullah et al., 2008).

Psychological states in the planning stage about the negotiation itself can also alter behavior in the bargaining stage. Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) found that negotiations in general prompt anxiety, which leads to lower expectations and aspiration points. When the negotiation is construed as a conflict, rather than displaying threat-rigidity, individuals displayed a motivated focus by generating more original competition tactics (De Dreu & Nijstad, 2008). In contrast to offensive motivations, when negotiators perceived an exploitation threat, this triggered an aggressive defense motivation leading to the development of more malevolent negotiation tactics (Baas et al., 2019). However, not all psychological states have such negative effects. Negotiators who garnered positive expectations during the planning stage had lower impasse rates as well as more positive evaluations of their counterpart and the negotiation process (Lieberman et al., 2010).

Beyond the effect of psychological states during the planning stage, the plans themselves can have various effects. Plans can affect bargaining behavior through goals. Even extremely difficult goals established during the planning stage led to higher aspiration points, first offers, and value claimed. (Miles & Clenney, 2012). Some goals are not ends themselves, but rather means to a superordinate goal. Trötschel and Gollwitzer (2007) describe a self-regulation strategy, where if-then plans are formulated. Specifically, negotiators plan a course of action once a specific milestone or means goal is reached. These if-then plans serve to coordinate means goals in a manner that facilitates the pursuit of a superordinate goal. Such self-regulatory

strategies led to greater value created and claimed as well as reduced the negative effects of loss-framing (Trötschel & Gollwitzer, 2007).

While ideally plans have the intended effect, planning behaviors can also have unintended consequences. The effort in searching for missing information about an issue, as opposed to readily accessible information, led to the perception that the issue was more important (Young et al., 2012). This could potentially cause negotiators to conflate more difficult to obtain information with more important or useful information. Beyond affecting perceptions of information, planning behavior can also affect perceptions of the counterpart's position. Indeed, preparing questions about a counterpart's adversarial position led to more positive evaluations of both the counterpart and their adversarial position (Chen et al., 2010). Finally, plans may have unintended effects because they are not based on accurate information. Because negotiators frequently underestimate the size of the bargaining zone (i.e., small-pie bias), estimates of counterpart's reservation points are often inaccurate and become self-fulfilling (Larrick & Wu, 2007). Negotiators are less likely to make an offer beyond the assumed reservation point, meaning most agreements will land further below the actual reservation point than negotiators realize. This results in a population-level bias, where negotiators overestimate the relative amount of value they claimed (i.e., large-slice bias). Only when confronted with strong disconfirming evidence did negotiators revise their original estimate (Larrick & Wu, 2007).

Another reason bargaining behavior differs from plans is because negotiators deliberately depart from their plans. This departure is adaptive when individuals incorporate new, meaningful information. For instance, negotiators develop a mental model about the issues of the negotiation during the bargaining stage. However, as the bargaining stage progresses, negotiators update

their mental model. As the mental models of the negotiator and counterpart converge during the bargaining stage, fewer impasses occur and greater value is created (L. Liu et al., 2012).

However, departures can also be maladaptive, such as when negotiating with a rival (Kilduff et al., 2016). When bargaining with a rival, negotiators were more likely to abandon their reservation point established during planning (Malhotra, 2010). This occurs because of a goal substitution effect, where the goal became to beat the opponent rather than to achieve the desired outcomes.

This suggests negotiators may prioritize winning ideal agreements, but wind up losing the ideal outcomes. Indeed, a limitation of negotiation research on the transition between the planning and bargaining stages is the absence of theory about a specific strategy regarding how negotiators will actually achieve a desired agreement. A strategy involves specific and coordinated goals, plans, and tactics to achieve a superordinate negotiation goal. This conceptualization departs from so-called “distributive and integrative strategies” which are more reflective of pro-self and pro-social motivations or general priorities (De Dreu et al., 2000; Pruitt & Rubin, 1986). Future research should prioritize the development of theory regarding episode-centric strategies.

Bargaining to Implementing

The tactics used and perceptions formed during the bargaining stage can have long-term, downstream effects on the implementing stage. For instance, low- and equal-power targets of anger make concessions to their counterparts when bargaining face-to-face, unlike high-power targets. Yet, low-, equal-, and high-power targets of anger all covertly sabotaged their counterparts during the implementing stage (Wang et al., 2012). Meaning, even when tactics have no overt or obvious detriment during the short-term (i.e., bargaining stage), they can have

negative implications in the long-term (i.e., implementing stage). These patterns highlight the importance of utilizing tactics without deleterious side-effects. Disappointment, for example, elicited greater cooperation in both the bargaining and implementing stages compared to anger (Wubben et al., 2009). Further, targets of disappointment experienced less anger themselves as well as evaluated their counterparts more positively and forgiving (Wubben et al., 2009).

However, even apparent low-risk tactics, such as perspective taking, can backfire. Epley and colleagues (2006) found that perspective taking lead to reactive egoism during the implementing stage, where negotiators predicted others would act selfishly ultimately leading the negotiators to personally act selfishly.

Such errors are related to inaccurate perceptions based on the past as well as the resulting perspective about the future. Trust-related issues inherently involve uncertainty in predicting the future. To achieve cognitive closure, negotiators may make quick and lasting judgements about trust during the bargaining stage (Acar-Burkay et al., 2014). Once established, such judgements can be robust against disconfirming feedback that can arise in the implementing stage (Acar-Burkay et al., 2014). However, it is not always the information that arises across time, but the temporal distance itself that can change negotiations. Indeed, when there is greater temporal distance between the agreement made during the bargaining stage and the expected realization of outcomes during the implementing stage, negotiators engage in greater integrative behavior due to higher construal levels (Henderson et al., 2006).

Beyond the tactics and perceptions that transpire during negotiations, the outcomes of the bargaining stage directly impact the implementing stage. Importantly, Curhan and colleagues (2009) observed in a field sample that subjective value (feelings about the deal, process, self, and relationship) from the bargaining stage during hiring negotiations predicted compensation

satisfaction and job satisfaction one-year later—while economic outcomes from the bargaining stage did not. Indeed, economic outcomes alone are frequently insufficient to cause rigorous deal implementation, requiring both trust and contracts to align incentives (Mislin et al., 2011).

Balancing economic and relational outcomes is essential, as the process of negotiating can result in relationship conflict (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020). This relationship conflict subsequently impacts post-agreement motivation, performance, and productivity (Hart & Schweitzer, 2020).

Between-Episode

Different Partner, Different Task

When engaging in another negotiation episode with a different partner and on a different task, the primary concern is spillover effects from the prior episode. For instance, Becker and Curhan (2018) found that high subjective value from the first negotiation increased feelings of pride and ultimately harmed economic performance in the second negotiation. This is because the benefits of subjective value are primarily relational, yet when working with a different partner on a different task, negotiators do not have the opportunity to capitalize on the enhanced relationship. Thus, there is strong reason to substantively address spillover effects. Even incidental emotions (which are short-term by definition), can have long-term impacts when a behavioral precedent is created (Andrade & Ariely, 2009). Frequently, past actions are used as a starting point for decision-making. Meaning, when an earlier decision was influenced by a fleeting emotion, it can still have an enduring impact (Andrade & Ariely, 2009).

While such spillover effects are likely, researchers have addressed them in different ways. Some argue spillover effects are unavoidable, to the extent they developed the unacquainted twins round robin research design to control for them (Elfenbein et al., 2018). Others control for spillover effects across multiple episodes statistically (e.g., utilizing random

intercepts in multilevel modeling; Mason et al., 2018). While yet others observe no evidence of spillover effects when switching to a different partner and a different task (van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010). Future research in this area could identify why and when such spillover effects are likely to occur.

Same Partner, Different Task

While tactics can have effects on subsequent stages, some tactics may also have effects on subsequent episodes. For instance, Ames and Wazlawek (2014) observed when a counterpart exaggerates their offense at a request (i.e., strategic umbrage) in a previous episode, this can lead the negotiator to believe their counterpart perceived them as too assertive. When in reality the counterpart perceived their behavior as appropriate (i.e., line crossing illusion). This limited self-awareness prompts the negotiator to use a subsequent, but unrelated, negotiation with the counterpart as an opportunity to make reparations. These reparation efforts involved appeasing the offended party by quickly agreeing to offers and resulted in less value created (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014). This decrease in value creation means both the strategic umbrage tactic and reparation efforts backfired. In contrast to this delayed effect, some tactics appear to have a more sustained effect. Specifically, negotiators continued to make concessions to a counterpart who displayed anger in a previous episode due to increased perceptions of toughness (van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010). While this tactic appeared to maintain its efficacy while face-to-face, it also decreased the negotiators desire for future interaction with the counterpart (van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010) and could lead to private retaliation (Wang et al., 2010). Indeed, subjective value was a better predictor than economic value at predicting desire for future interaction in real world contexts (Curhan et al., 2006).

Prioritizing subjective value and maintaining positive relationships with counterparts is important, as negotiators may need to work together in the future. Even if future negotiation plans do not yet exist, it is important to avoid “burning bridges” and the costs of persuading negotiators to return to the bargaining table despite a negative shared history (Kteily et al., 2013). One limitation of the negotiation literature is an abundance of focus on tactics to manage economic outcomes, with some attention to relational side-effects. However, there is not much on relational tactics to help manage relational outcomes and examinations of their economic side-effects. Theory on team processes differentiates interpersonal and task processes (Marks et al., 2001). Yet, negotiation researchers continue to neglect interpersonal processes despite identifying the importance of the outcomes they produce.

Different Partner, Same Task

Individuals frequently find themselves negotiating with a different counterpart during the same task. One reason is because the past negotiation episode—and perhaps the one with the preferred partner—resulted in an impasse. Negotiators who made the first offer in an episode that ended in an impasse experienced more regret, which resulted in fewer agreements, lower subjective outcomes, and cognitive depletion in subsequent episodes (Conlon et al., 2012). A second reason is because a better opportunity presented itself. Campagna and colleagues (2016) observed negotiators whose counterparts feigned anger in a prior episode reported lower subjective value (i.e., trust) and quickly reneged on their agreement after receiving an unexpected alternative offer. A third reason is due to developing a BATNA. Indeed, having invested effort in a BATNA in a prior episode had qualitatively different effects than the mere presence or absence of a BATNA which required no investment (Malhotra & Gino, 2011). Specifically, negotiators who invested in a BATNA developed a greater sense of entitlement and

higher aspirations, leading to more opportunistic behavior (Malhotra & Gino, 2011). This has important implications for future research on BATNAs, as participants in lab research are typically presented with an investment free BATNA rather than negotiating to obtain it.

This highlights an important assumption in the negotiation literature: a given negotiation episode is an end in and of itself. However, a negotiation episode may be a means to an end. Examining non-agreement motives in negotiations, Kang and colleagues (2020, p. 1) argue the purpose of a negotiation episode could range from “stalling for time, gaining information, or blocking a competitor from reaching an agreement.” Meaning, episodes are not equally important relative to one another, where negotiators may need to “lose a battle” to “win the war”. This suggests the presence a macro-strategy across episodes (as opposed to the micro-strategy across stages proposed earlier). This notion is not limited to multiple episodes focused on different agreements, but could also include multiple episodes focused on the same agreement. For example, a complex negotiation may require multiple episodes. Part of a strategy could include changing negotiators with different temperaments (e.g., “good cop, bad cop”) to either disrupt the momentum of the counterpart or to otherwise gain the upper hand. Future theory is needed to develop the notion of a multi-episodic negotiation strategy.

Same Partner, Same Task

Whether because the scope of the negotiation is so large that it cannot be completed in a single episode or parties determine during the implementing stage that another episode is necessary, the same task can require multiple negotiations with the same person. Negotiating with same person on the same task can present certain advantages and challenges. Indeed, the notion of rivalry in negotiations relies on a history of past competition with an identifiable opponent. This shared history implied in rivalry can lead to systematically different behavior,

such as increased unethical behavior (Kilduff et al., 2016). Molm and colleagues (2012) examined how the effect of relationship histories and relationship contexts affected the development of relational capital. In general, they found that low-power negotiators are more sensitive to both context and history.

Despite the prevalence and importance of repeated negotiations with the same person and task, this area remains one of the most understudied areas in the open system framework of negotiations. Future research could examine the factors in an implementing stage that trigger another round of negotiations. Indeed, unexpected external challenges can arise or interdependent efforts to actualize the negotiated agreement can breakdown due to internal management shortfalls. Further, many important negotiations are complicated and unfold over multiple episodes, ranging from the conventional to the extreme. For example, 150 organizations participated in the negotiation of the ISO 26000, an international and normative standard for corporate social responsibility (Helms et al., 2012). Each organization was encouraged to bring 6 experts from specific areas to serve on 13 different committees. After coding proposed changes and voting decisions from multiple drafts, Helms and colleagues (2012) found that the negotiation frames of representatives affected their persuasiveness over time and ultimately inter-organizational settlement. While this negotiation is an extreme example, it illustrates both the importance of considering how desired outcomes are achieved over the course of multiple negotiation episodes as well as how negotiations can involve multiple people and unfold across multiple levels.

Level

Divisions of Levels

Within-Person

One important way that change occurs within negotiators is through learning. Kray and Haselhuhn (2007) observed that extent individuals learned from negotiation trainings was contingent on implicit negotiation beliefs about whether negotiating ability was malleable or fixed. Specifically, individuals with malleable beliefs displayed greater growth over multiple negotiation episodes and had higher long-term performance. Research on negotiation training has also found that individuals were able to transfer an acquired skill to a novel task (Moran & Ritov, 2007) as well as that training had both short- and longer-term effects (i.e., one month; Zerres et al., 2013). Interestingly, when examining training effects across dyads, integrative negotiation training demonstrated was more effective for some roles (i.e., sellers) than others (i.e., buyers; Zerres et al., 2013). This suggests the potential for integrative negotiations to display disjunctive task features, where the amount of value created is a function of the most effective integrative negotiator (Steiner, 1972). Beyond training, another way to learn is through reflecting on the past and generating counterfactuals. Additive counterfactuals (“if only I had”) were more effective at creating and claiming value in subsequent negotiations than subtractive counterfactuals (“if only I hadn’t”; Kray et al., 2009). Further, individuals with malleable implicit negotiation beliefs generated more upward counterfactuals (how things could have been better) after negotiating, leading to more value created in subsequent episodes (Wong et al., 2012).

Another way change occurs within negotiators is through adaptation. Flynn and Ames Flynn and Ames (2006) observed that females who were high self-monitors were more successful at adapting to the level of assertiveness of their counterpart compared to females low in self-monitoring, enabling high self-monitors to claim more value. However, males did not receive the same benefit from self-monitoring (Flynn & Ames, 2006). While the best approach in some circumstances is to adapt, in other circumstances the best approach is to persist.

Negotiators who adopted a choice mindset perceived a greater zone of potential agreement, which resulted in increased persistence and negotiation outcomes (Ma et al., 2019). Another factor that affects persistence in negotiations is personality-situation fit. Specifically, negotiators high (low) in agreeableness engaged in integrative (distributive) negotiations displayed greater persistence, positive affect, and physiological arousal throughout the negotiation (Dimotakis et al., 2012).

Between-Person: Dyads

In dyadic processes, it is not just the behavior but the interpretation that matters. One factor in negotiators interpreting behavior is considering the counterparts point of view. Gilin and colleagues (2013) found evidence for a task-social competency fit, where empathy was more effective in relational tasks, while perspective taking was more effective in cognitive tasks. These different approaches are attuned to different signals which can affect expectations. This can occur to the extent that taking the counterpart's perspective can result in more suspicion and selfish behavior by the negotiator (Epley et al., 2006). Particularly when the motives for counterpart behavior are ambiguous, suspicious negotiators are more likely to attribute motives to the counterpart behavior (Sinaceur, 2010). Such social perceptions based on ambiguous information are not always accurate. Indeed, negotiators often have inaccurate assessments of how their own behavior is interpreted by their counterpart. Not only is it difficult to deduce what another is thinking, but the strategic displays of emotion, typical of mixed-motive contexts, compounds the difficulty (Ames & Wazlawek, 2014). Nonetheless, these views about others impact negotiation interactions, perhaps even more than personally held views. For instance, pessimistic expectations about their counterpart's ethical views were better predictors of engaging in dishonesty than the negotiator's ethical views (Mason et al., 2018). Further, the

counterpart's past integrative behavior was a better predictor of the negotiator's present integrative behavior than the negotiator's past integrative behavior (Sullivan et al., 2006).

Not only do interpretations of counterparts' behavior affect negotiators' responses, but counterparts' interpretations affect the efficacy of those responses. For example, only when a negotiator's angry response was perceived as appropriate did it lead to the counterpart making more concessions (van Kleef & Côté, 2007). When the negotiator anger was perceived as inappropriate, this actually had the opposite effect with the counterpart demanding more concessions. The interpretation of an emotion can also change depending on the focus of the anger. Offer focused anger led the counterpart to infer higher limits, resulting in higher counterpart concessions (Lelieveld et al., 2011). In contrast, person focused disappointment led to counterpart guilt, resulting in higher counterpart concessions (Lelieveld et al., 2011). The strategic use of emotion can also elicit different interpretations. Through contagion, early negotiator positive affect can increase counterpart positive affect, which can serve as a buffer against later negotiator anger (Filipowicz et al., 2011). However, strategic emotions can also elicit defensive responses from the counterpart. Specifically, feigned negotiator anger resulted in genuine counterpart anger and decreased trust (Campagna et al., 2016). Trust is an important factor in the efficacy of certain tactics. For instance, negotiator disappointment only led more concessions when the counterpart trusted them. This increases the premium on maintaining and repairing trust in negotiations. When trust is violated, a promise to change behavior can speed up the process (Schweitzer et al., 2006), however the effectiveness of an apology was contingent on the interpretation, as prosocial counterparts cooperated following an apology while proself counterparts competed (van Kleef & De Dreu, 2010).

While these directional interactions across the dyad (i.e., the effect of one person on the other), there is also value considering the dyadic interactions more generally. By combining a round robin design with the social relations model, Elfenbein and colleagues (2018) were able to partition the amount of variance in negotiation outcomes among unacquainted twins attributable to the negotiator, counterpart, and the dyadic interaction between the two. For economic outcomes, 24.8% was attributable to the dyad, with much less attributable to the negotiator (9.2%) and counterpart (9.2%). The opposite was found for subjective value, where 26.5% was attributable to the negotiator, with much less attributable to the counterpart (4.8%) and dyad (12.77%). These findings have important implications for the composition of traits in a dyad. While most negotiation research on dyadic composition focuses on the match-mismatch of the same traits (e.g., female-female, female-male, male-male), there is also potential for cross-traits (e.g., Machiavellian-need for affiliation).

Dyadic composition also extends to psychological states. For example, Sinaceur (2010) found that suspicious-trusting dyads created more value than either suspicious-suspicious or trusting-trusting dyads due to increased information exchange. This suggests the benefits of a trait or tactic are potentially contingent on the composition of the dyad. Indeed, mental simulation of a strong alternative (in lieu of an actual BATNA) led to higher aspiration points, first offers, and value claimed (Schaerer et al., 2018). However, the benefits of this imaginary BATNA were neutralized if the counterpart utilized the same tactic. This means in some instances differences across the dyad are desirable, while in other instances having high levels across the dyad are desirable. For instance, the effectiveness of cultural intelligence on predicting integrative sequences of behavior in mixed-culture dyads was determined by the lower-scoring member (Imai & Gelfand, 2010). These sequences, while perhaps conjunctive in nature (Steiner,

1972), involved coding transcripts to examine reciprocal tactics (distributive-distributive) and complementary tactics (distributive-integrative) across exchanges. Other researchers have used type of coding to capture dyadic communication interactions in negotiations generally (Kern et al., 2020) as well as across cultures (Giebels & Taylor, 2009).

Importantly, while much of the research on culture in negotiations “treats demographic variables as proxies for cultural orientation and culture’s influence on negotiators’ behaviors as stable and static,” there is a growing alternative approach which “treats culture as a series of situational cues that stimulate or constrain culturally conventional cognition and behaviors” (L. Liu et al., 2012, p. 292). This dynamic constructivism holds that cultural influences are contingent on individual and dyadic factors. For example, the mental models in intracultural dyads tended to converge to a greater degree than intercultural dyads, however this was contingent on the negotiators’ individual motives. Specifically, epistemic motives (i.e., need for closure) inhibited while social motives (i.e., concern for face) facilitated the convergence of mental models in intercultural dyads (L. Liu et al., 2012). Beyond individual motives, other research has examined dyad composition. W. Liu and colleagues (2012) found that relationally-focused cultures only displayed pro-social behavior when negotiating with an in-group member and when held accountable. Structural factors, like accountability and hierarchy, also play a role in cultural expression in negotiations. While vertical-individualist, horizontal-individualist, and horizontal-collectivist cultures followed an individually rational approach (i.e., maximized individual outcomes) when high in power, vertical-collectivist cultures followed a collectively rational approach (i.e., maximized group outcomes by personally taking fewer resources) when high in power (Kopelman, 2009). Not only does the negotiators’ power matter, but so does the counterparts’ power. Specifically, vertical-collectivist negotiators adopted a more competitive

approach with a high-power, vertical-individualist counterpart, but adopted a more cooperative approach with a high-power, horizontal-collectivist counterpart (Kopelman et al., 2016). Thus, vertical-collectivist negotiators will adapt their strategy to match their counterpart, but only when the counterpart is high in power.

While a considerable amount of negotiation research views the effects of culture as socially and contextually contingent, this is notably less so regarding the effects of gender. There are exceptions, however. For instance, Kray and Haselhuhn (2012), found that men in general take a more pragmatic perspective about ethics in negotiations, leading to greater unethical behavior. However, this was contingent on the individual beliefs of the negotiator, with fixed beliefs leading to more unethical negotiation behavior for men than malleable beliefs. Beyond individual beliefs, other research examined contextual factors. While women had consistently high relational capital, women created more economic capital in egalitarian contexts than hierarchical (Curhan et al., 2008). In contrast, men had high economic capital and low relational capital in hierarchical contexts, yet had high relational capital in egalitarian contexts. Future research on gender in negotiations could adopt a more dynamic constructionist approach, like the research on culture, and examine in greater depth the socially (i.e., dyadic influences) and contextually contingent effects (Bowles et al., 2022).

Between-Person: Networks

While researchers often focus on a single dyad in isolation, there are numerous situations where numerous dyadic interactions organized in networks are important to consider. One area networks are important to consider in studying negotiations is regarding reputations. While reputations have their origins in history of behavior, there is a considerable amount of social interpretation involved. This may explain why the relationship between past behavior and

reputation is often tenuous (Anderson & Shirako, 2008), particularly when an individual is less well known (i.e., is less central in a network). This suggests reputations, beyond behavior, are also comprised of first and secondhand information that are compiled via network processes. Firsthand information, such as through personal experience with or direct observation of a counterpart, can affect negotiators' strategy. For example, observing a recording of a counterpart expressing ambivalent emotions (i.e., tension or conflict between experiencing two emotional states simultaneously) during a different episode led to anticipating the counterpart would act submissively and increased negotiator intention to dominate the counterpart (Rothman, 2011). In contrast, secondhand information also can affect negotiators' strategy. Specifically, negotiators anticipated more guilt when considering lying to and also lied less to a counterpart with an honest reputation compared to a counterpart with a friendly reputation (SimanTov-Nachlieli et al., 2020). However, the benefits of a positive reputation backfired when evidence contradicted the reputation. Thus, it is important to understand both how reputations are formed and maintained across various sources.

A second area networks are important to consider in studying negotiations is regarding representatives. This is because representatives are either a third party or are agents for a diverse constituency. Meaning, representatives are unlikely to be equally socially connected to every individual involved. For instance, when representatives are group members they can range from prototypical (i.e., reflect the common interests of the in-group) to peripheral (i.e., while interests still primarily aligned with the constituents, some similarities with the out-group). Indeed, van Kleef and colleagues (2013) found that peripheral representatives demonstrated higher information-processing motivation, recalled more information, was more attuned to social-information via counterpart emotion, and created more value than prototypical representatives.

However, this only occurred when the procedures held representatives accountable to constituents (van Kleef et al., 2013). Further, constituents have different preferences for representatives depending on the objectives of the negotiation. Peripheral representatives are preferred when economic capital is the priority, perhaps due to perceptions that they would make effective boundary spanners, while prototypical representatives are preferred when relational capital is the priority (Teixeira et al., 2011). Diversity of preferences also matter, even when the representative is an uninvested, third party. Specifically, regarding what tactics constituents want a representative to use, there must be a consensus among constituents for the representative to use cooperative tactics. In contrast, a minority of constituents wanting competitive tactics is sufficient to influence the representative's use of competitive tactics (Steinel et al., 2009). These effects of constituent composition had an effect independent of the representative's personal social motives (i.e., cooperative or competitive).

A third area networks are important to consider in studying negotiations is regarding coalitions. While perspective taking increased value created and value claimed, empathy increased success at forming coalitions, suggesting a task-social competency match (Gilin et al., 2013). These differences have important implications for the tactics that negotiators use in contexts where economic outcomes and coalitions are priorities. For example, negotiator anger decreased the desire of counterparts to form (i.e., work with a counterpart) and maintain (i.e., continue to work with) coalitions with the negotiator (Van Beest et al., 2008). However, if a coalition is successfully formed, negotiator anger was effective at eliciting concessions (Van Beest et al., 2008). Further, while secrecy and deception are often thought to provide an advantage in mixed-motive negotiations, they can backfire when coalitions are also a priority. When negotiators possessed leverage making them a desirable coalition partner, proself

negotiators were less likely than prosocial negotiators to disclose this information (van Beest et al., 2011). Perspective taking amplified these differences for between prosel and prosocial negotiators.

Networks are relevant in negotiations any time there are multiple individuals involved and more than a single agreement is possible. This is in contrast to team negotiations, where a single agreement is a decision that reflects the collective will of the team. Interestingly, despite calls to consider negotiations as part of networks (Gelfand et al., 2012), no social network analytic techniques were used to study negotiations in management journals where individuals were nodes. L. Liu and colleagues (2012), however, did use social network techniques to operationalize mental models with ideas as the nodes. The only study in the reviewed articles that used social network techniques was in a sociology journal (Molm et al., 2012). This is not surprising given this field is where social network analysis traces its roots. Despite this lack of apparent statistical familiarity, network theorizing is simply an extension of existing dyadic theorizing to involve multiple individuals. Importantly, network theory is not purely structural (e.g., embeddedness, centrality, boundary spanners, etc.), but includes how people change because of the network and how the network changes because of the people (Griffin & Hemsley, 2022). There is a considerable amount of potential in re-examining conventional negotiation domains through a network lens. For example, one negotiations agreement is another negotiations alternative, suggesting a network conceptualization might prove effective for studying BATNA development. Indeed, the very notion of a BATNA implies there are more parties involved than the two at the bargaining table.

Within-Team

Negotiation scholars recognize that “dyads are qualitatively different from groups... Studying only dyads, therefore, could produce misleading information about how those phenomena operate in groups” (Moreland, 2010, p. 258). Indeed, Kern and colleagues (2020) observed teams held weaker fixed pie perceptions, used more integrative strategic behavior, and engaged in more complex communication patterns compared to dyads. Specifically, dyads tend to engage in simple reciprocity (e.g., offer-counteroffer), where sequences of team communication evident from intensive video coding changed both in terms of orientation (i.e., reciprocal versus complementary) and function (i.e., creating versus claiming). This more complicated strategy enabled teams to achieve optimal economic outcomes (Kern et al., 2020). Another example of how teams differ from dyads involves power and self-construal. Powerful, interdependent dyads made more generous offers, while powerful, interdependent teams made less generous offers (Howard et al., 2007). While some dyadic findings differ from team findings, other findings are consistent. For example, groups are still susceptible to anchoring bias when cooperatively motivated (de Wilde et al., 2018), however this bias is mitigated when held accountable or when competitively motivated.

Part of the reason teams operate differently than dyads is the added complexity of intragroup interactions. For example, the diversity in terms of social motive composition can affect negotiation strategies. Prosocial negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies to match the composition of the group, however prosocial negotiators did not adjust based on the social context (Weingart et al., 2007). These differences in team composition can result in subgroups (Bezrukova et al., 2012; Lau & Murnighan, 1998). While conceptually related to coalitions, subgroups are distinct due to the requirement that a single decision must reflect the collective and subgroups are not capable of striking out on their own. To arrive at a

single decision, hierarchical and consensus decision-making are alternative solutions with their own benefits and liabilities. For instance, in the presence of subgroups, hierarchical decision-making enables the majority to bypass the minority, while consensus decision-making enables the minority to block decisions. However, both of these liabilities were observed only when the obstructing group had proself motivation, while neither of these liabilities were observed with prosocial motivation (Ten Velden et al., 2007). Further, both in the lab and in the field, hierarchy hindered value creation within teams while consensus facilitated value creation within teams (Van Bunderen et al., 2018)

This research highlights that it is not the presence of differences between members, but how teams manage these differences that matter. Indeed, this is in large part why team researchers have dedicated less effort to examine team size (e.g., two versus n members) and more on ideal ways to achieve process gains and minimize process losses. This includes numerous team processes and emergent states that facilitate the conversion of team inputs into team outputs (Marks et al., 2001). While there is a considerable amount of research on team processes and emergent states (DeChurch et al., 2013), there remains only limited research on such constructs in negotiations. One exception in the reviewed articles examined iterative feedback between two emergent states, shared cognition and group identification, which both increased integrative gains (Swaab et al., 2007). However, considerably more research is needed in this area.

Between-Team

As discussed earlier, the planning stage for between-team negotiations frequently involves within-team bargaining due to diversity in team preferences. Importantly, this within-team bargaining preparatory for between-team bargaining is qualitatively different from

conventional within-team bargaining. Van Bunderen and colleagues (2018) found evidence of this in both lab and field settings. Specifically, hierarchical structures led to intra-team power struggles while negotiating a team strategy whereas consensus structures did not. However, this difference was only observed in the presence of inter-team conflict, when team members expected the strategy they were developing would directly affect between-team competition (Van Bunderen et al., 2018). Thus, what is true for standalone within-team negotiations does not generalize to within-team negotiations as part of the between-team planning stage—let alone the actual between-team bargaining stage. This underscores that what is true for standalone teams is unlikely to generalize to the between-team system context—even when the teams have yet to interact.

The closest representation of between-team bargaining in the reviewed literature was conducted by Halevy (2008). This study criticized the team negotiation literature for assuming teams had uniform interests and examined the effects of within-team conflict on the negotiations between two four-person teams. Teams composed of members with dissimilar payout structures performed worse than teams with similar payout structures (Halevy, 2008). Consistent with the open system paradigm, this study captured larger teams and addressed diversity in interests among members. However, the simplicity of and lack of specialization in the task suggest this team will operate more akin to a standalone team than a true multiteam system. This being said, the descriptive finding that ununified teams will underperform unified teams at the bargaining table is likely to generalize to multiteam systems. Yet, to generate prescriptive findings would require examining how true multiteam systems manage diversity of interests among members.

Importantly, there is evidence organizations engage in meaningful negotiations best conceptualized as multiteam systems. In the aforementioned ISO 26000 inter-organizational

negotiations, organizations were requested to bring six representatives with expertise in at least one of seven different areas to serve on different committees (Helms et al., 2012). Again, while this is an extreme example, this demonstrates that specialization and divisions of labor are ways that organizations manage complex negotiations. Not only are the structures different in more complex systems, but the inputs may differ as well. For instance, high-stakes, complicated negotiations are unlikely to be conducted by entry level managers. Rather, more senior leadership will oversee the negotiations. However, Hildreth and Anderson (2016) observed in field data that teams composed of high-power leaders failed to accomplish goals compared to teams composed of low-power leaders. Meaning, despite being peers (i.e., power has a low standard deviation), teams with high average amount of power underperformed teams with low average power. This was due status conflict, decreased focus on the task, and less effective information sharing. However, high power teams were more creative and persisted longer on difficult tasks (Hildreth & Anderson, 2016). This underscores the importance of understanding how to manage and lead teams of negotiators.

Cross-Level Effects

Recursion and Entrainment Between Levels of the System

Top-down effects within a system refer to the effect a higher level of the system has on a lower level of the system. For example, the effect of decision-making structures (Van Bunderen et al., 2018) and accountability systems (de Wilde et al., 2018) on the social motive composition of the team or how the team interacts (Ten Velden et al., 2007). Bottom-up effects within a system refers to how lower-level inputs combine to form higher-level outputs. For instance, the social motive composition of a team affecting the strategy a team will use (Weingart et al., 2007) or the power composition of a team contributing to dysfunctional team processes (Hildreth &

Anderson, 2016). Beyond how inputs affect throughputs, bottom-up effects also include how throughputs affect outputs. For example, team processes can lead to emergent states, such as subgroup conflict negatively affecting team identification (Halevy, 2008) or text-based communication leading to emotional contagion in virtual teams (Cheshin et al., 2011). Recursive cycles between emergent states and subsequent team processes are also possible (Cronin & Bezrukova, 2019; Marks et al., 2001).

Beyond recursion, entrainment between levels also has important implications for research on cross-level effects. As discussed earlier, the planning stage for a between-team negotiation will frequently include a within-team bargaining stage (Van Bunderen et al., 2018). However, entrainment also has important implications for appointing representatives, as the goals (Teixeira et al., 2011) and diversity of perspectives (Steinel et al., 2009) of the constituency will affect the type of representative appointed and their bargaining behavior. For both between-team and representative negotiations, how differences are managed prior to the between-party bargaining is essential. This highlights the importance of leadership, in helping to unify a party during the between-party planning stage as well as managing information flow during the between-party bargaining. Future research could also examine lower-level phenomenon that happen during team planning that can affect team bargaining. For example, dyads may independently engage in negotiation episodes to secure the support of another member on a given position prior to the entire team bargaining. Indeed, many coalitions, subgroups, and team outcomes may be influenced by dyadic processes that occur before the collective bargaining stage begins.

Recursion Between the System and Context

While recursion within the system (i.e., between levels of the system) is an area for future research, so is recursion between the system and the context it is embedded in. When Bendersky and McGinn (2010) examined open system phenomenological assumptions in the negotiations literature from 1990 to 2005, they identified external effects as an important element of an open system negotiation paradigm. They described external effects as occurring when the negotiation affects “larger organizational issues outside the negotiation itself” (Bendersky & McGinn, 2010, p. 786). This identifies a bottom-up effect of the negotiation system on the embedding context. However, open systems are open in the sense that “the constancy of environmental inputs cannot be assumed but must continually be the subject of investigation” (Katz & Kahn, 1978, p. 3). In this sense, a more complete open system negotiation paradigm also addresses top-down effects of the context—both as inputs as well as boundary conditions. Further, there is potential for recursion: where outputs of the system affect the context, where in turn the context serves again as input of the system (Ilgen et al., 2005).

Research has examined bottom-up effects of negotiations on industry standards (Helms et al., 2012), organizational commitment (Hornung et al., 2008), as well as compensation satisfaction and job satisfaction (Curhan et al., 2009). Just as the interactions of negotiators can have a bottom-up effect on the context the negotiation is embedded in (e.g., industry standards, organizational culture; Schneider, 1987), this context can have top-down effects on future negotiations (Curhan et al., 2008). Among the most frequently studied top-down effects involve gender stereotypes and culture. For example, stereotypic inferences from facial features predicted negotiation selection. Specifically, negotiators preferred feminine faces in either a male or female counterpart, but masculine faces when selecting either a male or female agent (Gladstone & O’Connor, 2014). Further, stereotypic assumptions that females are more easily

misled due to perceived lower competence led to an increased likelihood of females becoming targets of deception. (Kray et al., 2014). Culture also had an effect on negotiator responses to persuasion tactics over the course of hostage negotiations (Giebels & Taylor, 2009). Such sociological top-down effects are important in an open system negotiation paradigm. However, a dynamic constructionist perspective that examines how bottom-up processes both interact with these top-down effects is a high potential future direction (L. Liu et al., 2012), particularly involving gender and negotiations. Other top-down effects include the influence of the geopolitical context on negotiations (Giner-Sorolla & Maitner, 2013; Kteily et al., 2013; Liberman et al., 2010). For example, dehumanization of the counterpart increased the likelihood of exacting retributive justice (e.g., punishment) as opposed to restorative justice (e.g., resolution via negotiation; Leidner et al., 2013).

However, the existing literature on recursion between the system and context is limited as it does not address the task context. As an exception, Brooks and Schweitzer (2011) introduced a continuous shrinking-pie task, where the time it took to arrive at an agreement (in units of offer-counteroffer rounds) directly impacted the total amount of resources negotiators could divide. In this sense, there was a direct impact of the negotiation on the broader context and *visa versa*. Future research could expand other tasks to incorporate this type of logic. For example, the Shark Harvesters and Resource Conservation task (SHARC; Wade-Benzoni et al., 1996) examines negotiations between commercial and recreational fishing organizations about the collective over-harvesting of coastal sharks poised to harm the industry. The SHARC task is frequently used in negotiation research (Epley et al., 2006; Kopelman, 2009; Kopelman et al., 2016). Conventionally run, this task involves two parts, with the first involving negotiations about how the organizations need to adjust their fishing practices and the second involving

organizations choosing how much to harvest in the future. Future research could examine multiple episodes of the SHARC task, where the amount each organization harvested directly affects the amount available for the industry to harvest in the next round. This type of research would greatly advance open system negotiation research on recursion between the system and the embedding task context.

Conclusion

This systematic literature review uses the open system negotiation framework to reinterpret, organize, and evaluate existing findings. This approach takes stock of what is known as well as identifies deficiencies in the knowledge base and promising avenues for future research. A central argument to the open system negotiation framework is that findings derived from studying a cross-section of dyadic bargaining (i.e., closed system) cannot substitute for research dedicated to unpacking how negotiations unfold across time and levels (i.e., open system). Closed-system research cannot substitute for open-system research because there is no guarantee that it will generalize to the open-system contexts where negotiations frequently transpire. These areas where findings are unlikely to generalize are promising avenues for future research.

One particularly promising avenue for future research includes multi-episodic negotiations involving the same people engaged in the same task. Such multi-episodic contexts are perhaps the most conservative departure from the closed-system paradigm. In contrast to more radical departures that dramatically increase the complexity of the processes (e.g., between-team negotiations, networks of negotiators), multi-episodic negotiations can take the form of simply repeated bargaining tasks involving the same dyads. However, even such conservative departures can yield opposite predictions from the prevailing conventional wisdom.

In the following empirical section, I examine one of the most robust and widely prescribed practices: utilizing integrative strategies to optimize outcomes for both parties. By simply allowing for a dynamic, as opposed to static, performance context, I theorize that this conventional wisdom will contribute to maladaptive behavior and result in suboptimal outcomes. The purpose of the conservative departure is to demonstrate that even slight changes to how negotiation research is conducted can lead to novel theoretical contributions, let alone the potential of more radical departures to advance the science of negotiations.

CONCLUSION

Collectively, this dissertation has important implications for the practice and science of negotiations. First, the theoretical framework is precise and prescriptive about what constitutes open system negotiation research. This clarifies directions researchers can take to bridge the practitioner-researcher divide and strengthen the science. Second, the systematic review leverages the proposed theoretical framework to organize and critically evaluate the recent literature. This provides a new perspective on what is already known as well as identifies compelling future directions to develop a robust open system literature on negotiations. Third, the empirical portion demonstrates that examining conventional wisdom from the closed-system paradigm through an open-system lens can yield opposite predictions and important theoretical developments.

Beyond Time, the open system framework also suggests Level as an important area for practitioners. Indeed, teams of negotiators are the norm in international negotiations, union negotiations, as well as in mergers and acquisitions (Mannix, 2005). Yet, negotiation researchers have begun to recognize that there is no guarantee dyadic findings will generalize to the team level (Kern et al., 2020; Moreland, 2010). Further, evidence that these findings are not

guaranteed to generalize to the multiteam system level (Davison et al., 2012; Marks et al., 2005) indicate that negotiation researchers have only begun to scratch the surface. To this end, this dissertation calls for a moratorium on cross-sectional dyadic bargaining research. This includes not only a challenge to change phenomenological assumptions from closed system to open system, but also the theoretical and empirical tools necessary to begin such a change. As these changes are reflected in how negotiations are studied in the organizational sciences, they will change how negotiations are both taught and practiced. This will equip negotiators with the tools necessary to better navigate complicated decisions that unfold across time and levels of organizations.

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Figure 1

Transition and Recursion in Negotiation Stages and Episodes




Figure 2*Degree of Strength for Between-Episode Relationships*

	Same Person	Different Person
Same Task	Strongest	Strong
Different Task	Weak	Weakest

Figure 3

Entrainment of Stages across Levels

